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RESUMEN 
 
Según algunos filósofos (como Kim (2005), y Chalmers (1996)), no se puede 
explicar científicamente la conciencia fenoménica (es decir, el cómo se siente, por 
ejemplo, un dolor agudo en un dedo), puesto que dicha explicación ha de ir más allá 
de la explicación de habilidades y funciones cognitivas. Así, se afirma que aunque con 
ese explanans se puede dar cuenta de los llamados problemas fáciles de la conciencia 
(a saber, la diferencia entre estar despierto y estar dormido, o la integración de la in-
formación en un sistema cognitivo), no se puede explicar totalmente la conciencia fe-
noménica. En este artículo, argumento que esto es erróneo: la conciencia fenoménica, 
el llamado problema difícil de la conciencia, no es más difícil que los problemas fáci-
les, en la medida en que también la conciencia fenoménica puede explicarse totalmen-
te en virtud de habilidades y funciones cognitivas, y por tanto es susceptible de 
investigación científica. 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
According to some philosophers (e.g. Kim (2005), Chalmers (1996)), phe-
nomenal consciousness (i.e. that there is for instance, something it is like for one to 
feel a sharp pain in one’s finger) cannot be explained scientifically because explana-
tion in this case needs to go beyond the explanation of cognitive abilities and func-
tions. The claim is that although such explanans can account for the so-called easy 
problems of consciousness (e.g. the difference between wakefulness and sleep or the 
integration of information by a cognitive system), they cannot fully account for phe-
nomenal consciousness. In this paper, I argue that this is mistaken: phenomenal con-
sciousness, the so-called hard problem of consciousness is no harder than the easy 
problems in that I argue, phenomenal consciousness too can be fully explained in terms 
of cognitive abilities and functions and is therefore amenable to scientific investigation.  
 
 
I. CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
Thomas Nagel [Nagel (1974)] has famously provided the most influen-
tial characterisation of the notion of ‘experience’. He wrote 
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The fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that 
there is something it is like to be that organism…fundamentally an organism 
has conscious states if and only if there is something it is like to be that organ-
ism-something it is like for the organism…the facts of experience—[are] facts 
about what it is like for the experiencing organism [Nagel (1974), pp. 435, 439, 
emphasis in the initial]. 
 
Nagel points directly at ‘what-it-is-likeness’, the most important but difficult 
to describe feature of a conscious state. I will use the term ‘experience’ to re-
fer to the phenomenon of ‘what-it-is-likeness’. If there is something it is like 
for one to be in a mental state then the state is experiential. If there is nothing 
it is like for one to be in that state it is not. Moreover, since ‘what-it-is-
likeness’ has been typically taken to be the hallmark of conscious state, ex-
perience is by definition conscious. In summary, then, I take there to be 
‘something-it-is-like’ for a subject if and only if the subject is having an 
(conscious) experiential state.  
But to say that there is something it is like for one to be in an experien-
tial state is not merely to mean that there is something that an experience is 
like. That there is something that an experience is like is a mere truism in that 
it is plain that there is nothing such that it is not like something. We can say 
for instance, that there is something that a rock or a table is like. What-it-is-
likeness in the Nagelian sense quoted above does not concern experiences or 
mental states as what-it-is-like concerns rocks or tables. Nagel says that ‘the 
fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means…that there is 
something it is like for the organism ’. In other words, it means that there is 
something it is like to be us. For each subject there is something it is like to 
be that subject. Hence ‘what-it-is-likeness’ concerns the individual. If there is 
something it is like for the individual to be in a particular mental state then 
that state is experiential. What it is like to be in an experiential state is in the 
relevant sense, what it is like for one to be in that state. 
Now, as formulated by David Chalmers [Chalmers (1996)], the problem 
of experience is why there is any experience at all: how physical processes 
can give rise1 to experience. This is in a nutshell the problem of experience or 
as Chalmers calls it, the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness. We want to know 
how physical systems that can be exhaustively explained in the objective 
terms of function and structure can give rise to experience. According to 
some philosophers [Chalmers (1996), Levine (2001)], conscious phenomena 
cannot be explained in terms of physical or material phenomena and thus we 
are being presented with an explanatory gap. This idea is not new. John 
Locke claimed in his Essay, some 350 years ago, that there is no similitude 
between the ideas of secondary qualities and the insensible particles of matter 
that in different degrees and modifications of their motions cause these ideas 
(e.g., ideas of red or blue colour). According to the proto-explanatory gap 
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theorist, it is not impossible to conceive then that ‘God should annex such 
ideas to such motions and that he should also annex the idea of pain to the 
motion of a piece of steel dividing our flesh, with which that idea has no re-
semblance’ (book II, Ch. VIII, § 13).  
More recently, some philosophers have argued that we cannot solve the 
problem of experience because we cannot exhaustively explain experience in 
physical, cognitive or functional terms [Chalmers (1996), Jackson (2001), 
Levine (2001), McGinn (2004)]. According to them, experience cannot be 
explained in terms of cognitive abilities and functions. Chalmers has argued 
that since explanation in the case of experience does not concern exhaus-
tively the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions the problem of ex-
perience lies outside the domain of science. Our apparent inability to explain 
experience in those terms led Colin McGinn to propose that we cannot ex-
plain experience even in principle. According to him, human beings are cog-
nitively closed with respect to the solution to the problem. Just as our 
ancestor Homo Habilis2 cannot understand the truths of quantum physics or 
solve mathematical problems, we cannot solve the problem of experience. 
And even physicalists like Jaegwon Kim [Kim (2005)] have argued that we 
cannot explain experience in those terms even in principle. In what follows, I 
will first specify the hard problem of consciousness more exactly and I will 
then present the account of consciousness that can help us solve the problem. 
In the last part, I will sketch the strategy to adopt in order to do this.  
 
 
II. THE HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
According to some philosophers, the problem of experience is the 
‘hard’ problem of consciousness. In this section, we’ll get a better under-
standing of the problem of experience and we’ll see why according to these 
philosophers experience is the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness as opposed to 
the ‘easy’ problems of consciousness. In the end of this section, it will be-
come clear that my main aim in this paper is to show that both the easy prob-
lems and the hard problem of consciousness have the same standing; either 
they are both easy or they are both hard. There is nothing that makes experi-
ence a harder problem. And since according to most philosophers and scien-
tists, the easy problems are amenable to a scientific explanation, the hard 
problem is also amenable to such an explanation. 
For a start, we need to answer the following question: to what sort of 
things do we ascribe the property of consciousness? Sometimes the subject of 
the attribution of consciousness is the creature per se. We speak of a person 
or creature as being conscious or not. But there are cases in which the subject 
of the attribution is a particular mental state of the creature. David Rosenthal 
[Rosenthal (1997)] has suggested that ‘creature’ consciousness is a character-
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istic that a creature has when it can sense its surroundings and is awake. (A 
creature lacks this kind of consciousness when it is in a dreamless sleep.) 
Whereas it is far from obvious whether the term ‘consciousness’ is properly 
applied in this case, it is ‘state’ consciousness where the problem of experi-
ence lies3. State consciousness is ascribed to or withheld from particular men-
tal states. We may say then following the current trend (after Nagel (1974)) 
that one is in a conscious state of mind when there is something it is like for 
one to be in that state. Thus a conscious mental state is an experience; there is 
something it is like for one to be in that state. Of course, this does not explain 
what it takes for a mental state to be conscious. The most it provides us with 
is a distinguishing mark between conscious and unconscious states. Uncon-
scious states are states such that there is nothing it is like for one to be in 
them. This distinction characterises the phenomenon we wish to explain. We 
want to know what it takes for a mental state to be such that there is some-
thing it is like for one to be in it. 
Now, what is the problem of experience exactly? The major difficulty 
appears to be that the standard explanations in science are cast in objective 
terms (they are descriptive - in other words, they are given from a third-
person perspective) but experience is subjective. So it appears that no de-
scription of one’s conscious state in objective-scientific terms shows why 
there is something it is like for one to be in a mental state. All physical prop-
erties – the subject matter of physics – can be exhaustively explained in terms 
of function and structure as Chalmers puts it, but it appears that experience 
cannot be explained in those terms. So although we may know that experi-
ence is correlated with physical processes in the brain and that its existence is 
dependent upon them, we do not know (and maybe we cannot know) how it 
arises from those processes. The problem of how physical processes give rise 
to experience (after Chalmers (1995)) is called the ‘hard’ problem of con-
sciousness. Chalmers writes 
 
The really hard problem is the problem of experience....a subjective aspect....It 
is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question 
of how it is that [organisms] are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it 
that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-
processing, we have a visual or auditory experience...?...How can we explain 
why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an 
emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we 
have no good explanation of why and how it so arises [Chalmers (1995), p. 201, 
my emphasis)  
 
According to Chalmers, there are easy problems of consciousness. These are 
problems that seem directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive 
science, whereby a phenomenon is explained in terms of computational or 
neural mechanisms [Chalmers (1995)]. Thus the problem of the difference 
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between wakefulness and sleep, the integration of information by a cognitive 
system and the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental 
stimuli are such easy problems. These problems are related to consciousness 
but they are easy problems because there is no real issue as to whether these 
phenomena can be explained scientifically  
 
Why are the easy problems easy, and why is the hard problem hard? The easy 
problems are easy precisely because they concern the explanation of cognitive 
abilities and functions. To explain a cognitive function, we need only specify a 
mechanism that can perform the function [Chalmers (1995) p. 202, my emphasis].  
 
On the other hand, there seems to be real issue as to whether phenome-
nal consciousness can be explained scientifically4. According to Chalmers, 
phenomenal properties cannot be explained in terms of cognitive abilities and 
functions. This is of particular interest. A number of philosophers have re-
cently proposed that the notion of ‘phenomenal consciousness’ or experience 
(since they use these two terms interchangeably) does not map onto any of 
the current categories available in cognitive science and therefore it cannot be 
explained in cognitive terms (e.g. Levine (2001), McGinn (2004), Robinson 
(2004)). Nagel writes  
 
It [experience] is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of func-
tional states, or intentional states, since these could be ascribed to robots or 
automata that behaved like people though they experienced nothing. It is not 
analyzable in terms of the causal role of experiences in relation to typical hu-
man behavior—for similar reasons. I do not deny that conscious mental states 
and events cause behavior, nor that they may be given functional characteriza-
tions. I deny only that this kind of thing exhausts their analysis [Nagel (1974), 
pp. 435-6, my emphasis].  
 
As it turns out then, the main reason for claiming that experience cannot 
be explained scientifically is because explanation in this case needs to go be-
yond the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions. The claim is that al-
though such explanans can account for the easy problems of consciousness, 
they cannot fully account for the hard problem. By showing therefore that the 
hard problem can be fully accounted for in terms of cognitive abilities and 
functions, we show in effect that both the easy problems and the hard prob-
lem have the same status; either they are both easy or they are both hard. If 
the easy problems are amenable to a scientific explanation, then the hard 
problem is also amenable to such an explanation. It all depends on how we 
are to explain in turn those mental or cognitive abilities. My aim here is to 
show that the hard problem concerns exhaustively the explanation of cogni-
tive abilities and functions. 
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III. A COGNITIVE ACCOUNT OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
Following Rosenthal [Rosenthal (2006)], we can suggest that to say that 
a mental state is an experience is to say that one is conscious of or aware of 
that state, and to say that one is conscious of that state is to say that one has a 
distinct (higher-order) state, i.e. a higher-order thought (HOT) about this 
state5. What it is like for one to be in a particular mental state is determined 
by the way that one’s awareness or consciousness represents that state. This 
awareness is explained in terms of one’s having a suitable higher-order 
thought about the (unconscious) first-order state. But the higher-order 
thought by virtue of which one becomes conscious of a first-order state need 
not itself be conscious. This requires a third-order thought (introspection). 
This way, a theory of what it is to be conscious is kept distinct from a theory 
of what the objects of this consciousness are.  
Hence, on this view, my awareness of a mental state does not have to be 
itself something I am conscious of; this state is experienced by virtue of my 
awareness of it, but this awareness need not be something I am aware of. But 
I can be aware of it and that is roughly by virtue of a further awareness to the 
effect that I am conscious of or aware of being aware of a particular mental 
state. One can be aware of one’s being in a particular mental state and not be 
aware of being conscious of being in that state. It appears then that there is a 
distinction to be drawn between three kinds of states: unconscious states, 
nonintrospectively conscious states (first-order experiences) and introspec-
tively conscious states (higher-order experiences). We can use a small piece 
of notation here and say that if m is the first-order (unconscious) mental state, 
then A(m) is the nonintrospectively conscious mental state – i.e. one is aware 
that one is in m, and A(A(m)) is the introspectively conscious state – i.e. one 
is aware that one is aware of being in m.  
Now, a HOT is an episodic intentional state with an assertoric mental 
attitude. In other words, a HOT is an occurrent belief. A HOT has the form ‘I 
believe that p’, where p is itself the report of a first-order mental state: either 
a mental qualitative state, e.g. ‘I believe that either I am seeing or seeming to 
see a red patch’, or a propositional attitude, e.g. ‘I believe that I believe there 
is a red patch’ (or ‘I am aware that I believe that six sevens are forty two’). 
The following statements also report higher-order mental states: ‘Tom be-
lieves that John believes it is raining’, ‘Tom believes that John either sees a 
red patch or seems to see a red patch’. Notice that these reports do not require 
Tom be conscious. Given that Tom’s believing that it is raining didn’t imply 
that there is anything it is like for Tom to have that belief, I do not see that 
Tom’s having a belief about John implies there is anything it is like for Tom 
to have that belief - even though, being a belief about John’s beliefs, it is a 
second-order belief. However, as it will be shown more fully in what follows, 
if I have a higher-order de se belief, then, plausibly, that does imply that there 
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is something it is like for me to have that belief. Thus ‘I believe that I believe 
that six sevens are forty two’ or ‘I believe that I believe that it is raining’, or 
‘I believe that either I see a red patch or I seem to see a red patch’, do require, 
plausibly, for their truth that I am conscious of the relevant first-order mental 
states.  
Further, a HOT is unmediated. Mental states generate higher order 
thoughts in an unmediated way. Only mental states can become conscious in 
such a way. One cannot become conscious of the non-mental liver state for 
instance, simply by being in that state. By contrast, one can become aware of 
being in a mental state simply by being in that state. The point is this. One 
cannot become unmediately conscious of being in a non-mental state. One 
can only be mediately conscious of being in it. If one’s doctor informs one to 
this effect then one’s knowledge is mediate (via speaker understanding of 
what the doctor said), e.g. ‘I believe that my liver state is in poor condition’, 
whereas in contrast ‘I feel a pain in my liver’ for instance is a mental state 
because it is immediate. Only mental states can become unmediately con-
scious. And since mental states become conscious (such that there is some-
thing it is like for one to be in them) by virtue of an occurent HOT, the HOT 
must be unmediated. Sensations, perceptions and thoughts are to be distin-
guished from physiological states such as liver states. The former are mental 
states in the sense that one can become conscious of being in them. One can-
not become conscious of being in a liver state in the same sense. Suppose that 
one’s doctor informs one that one’s in such and such liver state or imagine 
that one feels queasy and knows this is a symptom of a particular liver state. 
In these cases, one is conscious of the liver state in the sense that one can be 
conscious about anything. One can be conscious of a rock or a table. But one 
cannot become conscious of the liver state simply by being in that state. By 
contrast, one can become aware of being in a mental state simply by being in 
that state. (Although one can be in a mental state and not be aware of being in 
it, as one can be in a liver state and not be aware of being in it.) The point is 
this. One cannot become immediately (or unmediately) conscious of being in 
a non-mental state. One can only be mediately conscious of being in it. 
Finally, HOTs are de se beliefs: the higher-order representation repre-
sents the lower-order state as a state of oneself. Rosenthal writes 
 
Conscious[ness] of oneself…must in any case occur if there is something it is like 
to have the experience. We’re not interested in there being something it’s like for 
somebody else to have the experience; there must be something it’s like for one 
to have it, oneself. Without specifying that, what it’s like would be on a par with 
what it’s like to be a table [Rosenthal (2002), p.656, my emphasis]6. 
 
Importantly, being conscious of ourselves in that way does not require 
that we are aware of ourselves in some privileged way that is antecedent to 
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the higher-order thoughts we have about our own mental states. Suppose that 
you are in a grocery store and by looking out the window you notice that 
somebody (more accurately the reflection of a man) sitting alone in the store 
who’s wearing a similar long black coat and is looking out of the window not 
realising that this person is you. Your thought that ‘the man with the black 
coat is looking out the window of this store’ refers to you but it does not refer 
to you as such. Suppose that you suddenly realise that the man in question is 
you. This time your thought is expressing a different proposition ‘I think I’m 
looking out a window of this store’ [Perry (1979)].  
In this case the indexical is essential. The higher-order thought, picks 
oneself out as the thinker of the first-order thought. A de se first-order 
thought that I am in F is not enough. Applied to Perry’s case, the switch is 
not just from ‘That man is looking out the window’ to ‘I am looking out the 
window’. By itself that is just a switch from one first-order thought to an-
other. The idea is that the second de se thought disposes one to have a higher-
order thought: ‘I think I am looking out the window’. What is required then is 
a higher-order thought which identifies one as the thinker of that first-order 
thought: ‘I think I am in F’ i.e. ‘It is me who thinks I am in F’ etc. The rele-
vant thought picks out the individual who thinks this thought without de-
scribing the individual. The thought that ‘I am in F’ disposes me to have 
another thought that identifies the individual the first thought is about as the 
thinker of that first thought. But this thought does not describe that individual, 
it only refers to it. The idea is that the thought that identifies the individual the 
first thought is about as the thinker of that thought does not rest on an inde-
pendent special access to the self. Essentially indexical self-reference simply 
consists in the realisation that the individual who looks out the window is the 
same as the individual who thinks that somebody looks out the window. Con-
strued thus, essentially indexical self-reference requires no self-consciousness 
or any connection between first-order-person thoughts and the self7. 
Essentially indexical self-reference construed thus does not require self-
consciousness and fits well with recent experimental findings. Gordon Gallop 
[Gallop (1970)] has shown that chimpanzees for instance, but not monkeys, 
as well as children over 18 months of age can recognize themselves in mir-
rors. Gallop used the following procedure. When a chimpanzee was anesthe-
tized for its periodical medical check-up, an odourless red dye was applied to 
the chimpanzee’s forehead while it lay unconscious. When the animal was 
awake again, a mirror was placed next to its cage, and the chimpanzee 
showed all the behaviours indicative of mirror self-recognition. The animal 
tried to wipe the dye from its forehead and it also positioned its body at vari-
ous angles in front of the mirror in order to see places it could not ordinarily 
see on its own body8. This ability has taken to imply the possession of a ru-
dimentary ‘concept of self’. But this ‘concept of self’ refers merely to the ca-
pacity of self-recognition or mirror recognition. Although we may (and there 
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is no reason why we shouldn’t) suggest that these creatures have the ability 
for essentially indexical self-reference and they therefore can have HOTs and 
enjoy conscious qualitative states, this notion of recognition falls short of the 
most distinctive ability in human beings, which allows us to reflect upon our 
mental lives and the mental lives of others. Self-consciousness requires this 
ability. Self-consciousness does not involve only the ability for self-reference 
or self-recognition. It involves an awareness of the ability for self-recognition 
and it is closely related with the concept of ‘personhood’ that distinguishes us 
from other non-human animals. Self-consciousness requires the ability that 
enables us to attribute mental states in everyday life and to reflect upon our 
mental lives and the mental lives of others9.  
Hence, it appears that first, the ability for self-recognition or indexical 
self-reference does not require self-consciousness, reflexivity, introspective 
capacities or any related sophisticated cognitive ability. Second, since self-
reference does not require self-consciousness, it is most likely that not only 
human beings can have HOTs. Other creatures with far less sophisticated 
cognitive abilities can have HOTs. If it is true that we are able to experience 
the world by virtue of the occurrence of HOTs, then if a creature didn’t have 
the capacity for HOTs, it wouldn’t experience anything. Plausibly enough, 
human babies and non-human primates such as chimpanzees and orang-utans 
do not possess self-consciousness or the capacity for introspection. Arguably 
and at any rate, their inability to pass theory of mind tests strongly suggests 
that they do not possess such sophisticated cognitive abilities. At the same 
time, it would be wrong to deny that they cannot have for instance, any sen-
sory experiences. It certainly sounds counterintuitive to suggest that they do 
not experience any pains or itches10. 
 
 
VI. FOUR STEPS TOWARDS THE SOLUTION OF THE HARD PROBLEM 
 
How are we to employ this account to solve (or dissolve) the hard prob-
lem of consciousness? Here are our four steps:  
 
Step 1 
All manner of first-order mental states can occur unconsciously. Both 
first-order mental qualitative states (e.g. sensory states) and propositional at-
titudes (e.g. beliefs, desires etc) can occur unconsciously. This involves the 
idea that even mental states of the sort that possess the so-called qualia (be-
ing first-order) can occur unconsciously. Hence, perceptual experiences, for 
example, experiences of the sort involved in seeing green and smelling the 
sea air; bodily sensations such as feeling an itch, feeling hungry, having a 
stomach ache; felt passions or emotions, for example, feeling delight, lust, 
fear; and felt moods, for example, feeling elated or depressed, can occur un-
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consciously. Consciousness is a matter of there being something it is like for 
the subject to be in the state in question. The mental qualitative states that we 
are not aware of are not conscious: if one is not in any way aware of a mental 
state or that one is in that state, then there is nothing it is like for one to be in 
it. And indeed, plausibly enough, if one is not aware of what it is like, then 
there is nothing it is like for one. And this leads us to divide philosophical la-
bour and to characterise qualia and experience (i.e. what it is like to have 
them) independently of each other and employ different explanatory accounts 
for them11. 
 
Step 2  
The same fundamental kind of experience or consciousness is involved 
in both conscious qualitative/sensory states (i.e. those states that possess 
qualitative properties or qualia) and conscious propositional attitudes. Ar-
guably, the problem of experience or consciousness does not concern only 
our sensory or qualitative states. For one thing, whenever one is in a con-
scious state there must be something it is like for one to be in it. Imagine the 
case where one discovers that one’s associate has lied about something, or 
the case where one suddenly realises that she has lost her keys. In both cases 
the mental state one undergoes, in other words, the mental state one is in, is 
like something for one. There is something it is like for you to discover that 
your associate has lied to you and there is something it is like for one to real-
ise that she had lost her keys12.  
There are more clear cases of pure cognitive experiences. Strawson 
[Strawson (1994)] asks the reader to imagine two persons: a monoglot 
Frenchman, Jacques and a monoglot Englishman, Jack and then he asks 
whether the difference between them as they listen to the news in French, 
really consists in the Frenchman’s having a different experience. He correctly 
answers that Jacques’ experience when listening to the news is utterly differ-
ent from Jack’s, even though there is a sense in which they both have the 
same aural experience (they are exposed to the same stream of sound). 
Strawson suggests that the difference between the two can be expressed by 
saying that Jacques, when exposed to the stream of sound, has an ‘experience 
(as) of understanding’ or an ‘understanding-experience’, while Jack does not: 
‘there is something it is like, experientially, to understand a sentence, spoken 
or read’ [Strawson (1994), p. 7]. And this does seem to be distinct or addi-
tional to hearing or seeing the sentence.13  
Now, why think that the experiential aspect of a conscious sensory state 
is unlike the experiential aspect of a conscious propositional attitude in which 
no sensory quality is somehow involved? What should be the motivation for 
distinguishing two modes of consciousness, as distinct from different kinds 
of objects of consciousness? It is certainly true that what it is like for one to 
be in a visual conscious state is not the same as being in an auditory con-
Experiencing a Hard Problem? 
 
125
scious state. This is because different modalities are involved and therefore 
different qualitative properties. But it appears that either there is something it 
is like for one to be in a particular mental state or there isn’t. In other words, 
either a mental state is experienced or it is not. After all, we do not distin-
guish a visual mode of consciousness from an auditory mode. We distinguish 
sights and sounds as objects of consciousness. 
Hence, since both conscious sensory/qualitative states and conscious 
propositional attitudes are experiences in the sense that there is something it 
is like for one to be in them, and all manners of mental qualitative states and 
properties are not essentially conscious (i.e. such that if one is in a mental 
state with one of these properties then one is in a conscious state), we have 
good reason to believe that the same fundamental kind of experience is in-
volved in both qualitative and non-qualitative conscious states. We can then 
suggest that the same kind of consciousness can account for the experiential 
aspect of both conscious qualitative states and conscious propositional atti-
tudes. It is in virtue of the same cognitive function (HOTs) that there is some-
thing it is like for one to be in a mental state and, as Chalmers puts it, to 
explain a cognitive function we need only specify a mechanism that can per-
form the function. Thus understood, experience is an aspect of cognition and 
of the brain processes active in cognition. Thus the hard problem of con-
sciousness is not unlike the easy problems which according to most philoso-
phers, lie in the realm of science.  
 
Step 3  
We give a non-circular cognitive account, such that none of the abilities 
that one must possess for a suitable HOT to occur essentially requires con-
sciousness. We saw that the HOTs in virtue of which we are non-
introspectively conscious are not themselves conscious. This is because we 
are not conscious of them and for a mental state to be conscious is for one to 
be conscious of it. The core requirement of such HOTs is that they must rep-
resent the first-order states as states of oneself. The ‘of oneself’ requirement 
amounts to the ability for self-reference, which in turn does not require self-
consciousness or any introspective capacities. What is required is simply the 
capacity for self-recognition or the ability for indexical self-reference.14 None 
of the abilities that one must possess for a suitable HOT to occur essentially 
requires consciousness. And arguably, genuine explanations work by drawing 
connections between a set of facts (the explanans) and a distinct set of facts 
(the explanandum). Our explanation then satisfies that criterion since the con-
nection is drawn between non-conscious cognitive facts and experiential or 
conscious facts. 
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Step 4 
It might be objected that we can still coherently imagine that there is a 
living organism which is functionally and behaviourally indistinguishable 
from a conscious one (with which they share the same environment and have 
same causal histories), with which you can have a meaningful conversation 
and which has a HOT of the kind described above, e.g. a belief to the effect 
that it realises (veridically self-ascribes) that a solution to a problem goes a 
certain way without thereby being anything it is like for the organism to be in 
that state (is not conscious). But first, if that is true, then it seems that zom-
bies can do all that we do; the lack of consciousness has no impact on the 
zombie. Then what is consciousness doing in us non-zombies? It is either that 
there is nothing missing from a non-conscious creature or that there is some-
thing missing – consciousness. If the latter, what could consciousness possi-
bly add which is not already, or cannot be, stated/captured in behavioural, 
functional and physical terms? Second, contrast the case of a non-conscious 
with a non-vital zombie. Can we, for instance, imagine something that was 
capable of reproduction, development, growth, metabolism, self-repair and 
immunological self-defence, but which is not alive? Well, maybe we can. But 
this shows only ‘that you can ignore “all that” and cling to a conviction if 
you’re determined to do so’ [Dennett (1991a), pp. 281-282]. To explain the 
phenomenon of life we had to appeal to the biological level, to certain bio-
logical functions and homeostatic processes. Equally, to explain the phe-
nomenon of consciousness we must appeal to the cognitive level. 
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NOTES 
 
1 Note that ‘give rise’ is used here in the most neutral sense possible. The reader 
must not adhere to any dualist intuitions that may be triggered by such an expression. 
2 Assuming that Charles Darwin’s story about the evolution of the species is for 
the most part true. 
3 For one thing, there are many creatures that can detect changes in the envi-
ronment while awake to which we would hesitate to ascribe the property of being 
conscious. There are certainly borderline cases, but the cases of insects, bees and cat-
erpillars are suggestive enough. The point is that ‘creature’ consciousness can be ap-
plied to creatures whose mental states are in some respect like our non conscious 
states we are in when we are awake. It is then plain that the puzzling bit about con-
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sciousness does not lie in creature consciousness. Therefore, I shall leave the discus-
sion of this notion for another time. 
4 It must be noted that there is an opposing view according to which there are 
no easy problems of consciousness. See E.J. Lowe (1997). 
5 Consciousness in this sense is a relational property; a subject is in a conscious 
state if she is conscious of that state or aware of being in that state. And indeed, it 
does sound very counterintuitive to suggest that mental states can be conscious them-
selves or that consciousness is some intrinsic or essential property of mental states. 
6 In fact, HOTs are doubly de se i.e. the first-order mental states are themselves 
de se e.g. I am seeing or seeming to see a red patch. The HOT is thus doubly de se: ‘I 
believe I am seeing or seeming to see a red patch’. So the first-order mental state of 
which I am conscious is ‘I am seeing or seeming to see a red patch’, not ‘Someone is 
seeing or seeming to see a red patch’, and not ‘There is a red patch’ since the latter 
does not report a mental state. 
7 For further remarks on the Kantian idea that self-reference does not require 
self-identification see Shoemaker (1968), Brook (2001) and Rosenthal (2004, 2006). 
8 Recently, it has been demonstrated that apart from orang-utans and gorillas, 
Asian elephants too possess the ability for self-recognition [Plotnik, de Waal, Reiss 
(2006)]. 
9 Experimental studies of normal and abnormal development suggest that the 
abilities to attribute mental states to self and to others are closely related. Thus inabil-
ity to pass standard ‘theory of mind’ tests, which refer to others’ false beliefs, may 
imply lack of self-consciousness. Individuals who persistently fail these tests may, in the 
extreme, be unable to reflect on their intentions or to anticipate their own actions [Frith 
& Happe (1999)]. Baron-Cohen (1995) has suggested that the core impairment in autism 
stems from the failure to acquire such a ‘theory of mind’ which in effect, suggests lack 
of self-consciousness or of the ability to become introspectively conscious. 
10 It is worth noting that although the first-order mental states are themselves de 
se, and so e.g. some animals have de se first-order mental states, this does not require 
that the animal have a concept of the self, or any concepts. Since, if the animals’ first-
order states are unconscious, not being the objects of unmediated HOTs, then the 
animal does not need a conceptual repertoire. Only if the animal becomes conscious 
of its first-order mental state, becomes conscious that say, it is seeing a red patch, will 
it need to have the relevant concepts (including a rudimentary concept of itself). 
11 One might object that although feelings, emotions etc. together with our de-
sires and beliefs can occur unconsciously (most obviously so), there cannot be uncon-
scious pains. Well, why not? As Rosenthal suggests, we normally do speak of having 
the same headache all afternoon, even though the awareness of our pain is intermit-
tent. Whereas the ‘headaching’ quality endures all afternoon, sometimes we have a 
higher-order thought towards it and sometimes not. During these intervals, that is, 
when we do not have a higher-order thought towards the headache, there is nothing it 
is like to have it. And indeed during these intervals we do not feel the hurtfulness of 
the pain “when one is intermittedly distracted from a headache or pain, it is natural to 
speak of having had a single, persistent pain or ache during the entire period. It would 
be odd to say that one had a sequence of brief, distinct, but qualitatively identical 
pains or aches” [Rosenthal (2006), p. 32]. There are recent experimental findings sug-
gesting that sensory qualities can occur unconsciously (blindsight - Weiskrantz 
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(1986), visual-form agnosia and optic ataxia - Milner & Goodale (1995), change de-
tection - Fernandez-Duque & Thornton (2000); Simons et al. (2002); Repp (2001), 
change blindness - Mack and Rock (1998), etc.) as there are some good philosophical 
arguments to this effect (Rosenthal (1991), Dennett (1991b). But all one needs to do is 
not argue for idea that the so-called qualia are not essentially conscious – only that 
there is room to hold that they are not. Opponents of this view (e.g. Chalmers (1996) 
and Block (2002)) typically treat the idea that qualia are essentially conscious as an 
axiom; they do not argue for it. 
12 Or take Rosenthal’s example that one suddenly realises that the solution to a 
problem goes a certain way. 
13 Think also of a priori statements such as ‘5 + 7 = 12’. It seems plain that 
there is something it is like for one to understand this proposition over and above the oc-
currence of any sensory qualities. There are other examples. There is a general sense for 
instance, in which we experience our actions as purposive. Agentive experiences repre-
sent one’s own behaviour as self-generated. What kind of sensory qualities could ac-
count for the fact that there is something it is like for one to be in those states? 
14 ‘Subjectivity’ is sometimes used interchangeably with ‘consciousness’ and 
‘experience’. This is a bit unfortunate since both Chalmers and Nagel suggest that 
what makes the problem of consciousness really hard is the fact that conscious facts 
are subjective. Here’s what Nagel says: ‘Conscious facts, namely facts about what it 
is like to be a human being, or a bat, or a Martian, appear to be facts that embody a 
particular point of view. The facts about consciousness are perspectival in the sense 
that our conscious experiences have an inbuilt perspectival character; they embody a 
particular point of view’ [Nagel (1974), p. 441]. We want to know what it is like for 
me to be in a certain mental state, not for you of for any body else. An explanatory ac-
count of experience then must explain this ‘perspectivity’ or ‘point of view’. Self-
ascriptions of the kind described above can explain the perspectival character of our 
conscious states. When one recognises oneself one has a conception of oneself as em-
bedded in an objective world; the subject represents oneself as being embedded in an 
objective world. Employing the Nagelian jargon, we can say that the ability for self-
recognition enables one to embody a particular ‘point of view’ and makes the sub-
ject’s mental states experiences, that is, mental states for the subject. 
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